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Type theory and its meaning explanations
Jonathan Sterling
Thanks to Bob Harper, Peter Dybjer, Bengt Nordstro¨m, Carlo Angiuli and Darin
Morrison for invaluable conversations which helped sharpen my view of the
meaning explanations for computational and intensional type theories. All
mistakes are mine.
Abstract. At the heart of intuitionistic type theory lies an intuitive semantics
called the “meaning explanations”; crucially, when meaning explanations are
taken as definitive for type theory, the core notion is no longer “proof” but
“verification”. We’ll explore how type theories of this sort arise naturally
as enrichments of logical theories with further judgements, and contrast this
with modern proof-theoretic type theories which interpret the judgements and
proofs of logics, not their propositions and verifications.
Contents
Chapter 1. Logical Theories 5
1. Judgements of a logical theory 5
2. Higher-order judgements 6
3. Propositions and verifications 7
4. Judgements for verifications 8
Chapter 2. Computational Type Theories 11
1. The categorical judgements 11
2. The functional sequent judgement 12
3. The definitions of types 14
Chapter 3. Proof Theories and Logical Frameworks 19
1. Proof-theoretic type theory 19
2. Martin-Lo¨f’s equational logical framework 21
3. A critique of MLLF 23
4. A way forward: verifications & uses 25
Bibliography 27
3

CHAPTER 1
Logical Theories
To start, we will consider the notion of a logical theory; in my mind, it be-
gins with a species of judgements that can be proposed, asserted, and (if they are
evident) known.
1. Judgements of a logical theory
The basic forms of judgement for a logical theory will be P prop and P true ;
and what is P? It is a member of the species of terms, which are made meaningful
in the course of making the judgement P prop (“P is a proposition”) evident for a
proposition P .
The forms of judgement may be construed as containing inputs and outputs ; an
input is something which is inspected in the course of knowing a judgement, whereas
an output is something which is synthesized (or created) in the course of knowing
a judgement. The positions of inputs and outputs in a judgement constitute what
is called its mode, and we color-code it in this presentation for clarity.1
To each judgement is assigned a meaning explanation, which explicates the
knowledge-theoretic content of the judgement. For a judgement J , a meaning
explanation should be in the form:
To know J is to know...
The meaning of the judgement P prop is, then, as follows:
To know P prop is to know that P is a proposition, which is to
know what would count as a direct verification of P .
So if a symbol P is taken to denote a proposition, we must know what sort of
thing is to be taken as a direct verification of P , and this is understood as part
of the definition of P . A “direct verification” is understood in constrast with an
“indirect verification”, which is to be thought of as a means or plan for verifying
the proposition; these distinctions will be explained in more detail later on. Now,
the judgement P true (“P is true”) is only meaningful in case we know P prop
(this is called a presupposition). Then the meaning of P true is as follows:
1We will not see any judgements with outputs at first, but it will become necessary as soon as we
consider judgements about computation, where the reduction of a term is synthesized from the
redex. Modes may be used to construe a judgement as having algorithmic content.
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To know P true is to have a verification of P .
From the (implicit) presupposition P prop, we already know what counts as a
verification, so the meaning explanation is well-defined. Note that having a means
or plan for verifying P is equivalent to having a (direct) verification; this follows
from the fact that one may put into action a plan for verifying P and achieve such a
verification, and likewise, it is possible to propound a plan of verification by appeal
to an existing verification.
2. Higher-order judgements
The judgements we have described so far are “categorical” in the sense that
they are made without assumption or generality.
2.1. Hypothetical judgement. We will need to define a further form of
judgement, which is called “hypothetical”, and this is the judgement under hypoth-
esis J (J ′) , pronounced “J under the assumption J ′”.Its meaning explanation
is as follows:
To know the judgement J (J ′) is to know the judgement J
assuming you know the judgement J ′.
Hypothetical judgement may be iterated, and J (J1,J2) will be used as nota-
tion for for J (J2) (J1).
2.2. General judgement. Another kind of higher order judgement is “gen-
eral judgement”, which is judgement with respect to a variable, |x J , pronounced
“for an arbitrary x, J ”. The meaning explanation for this new judgement is as
follows:
To know the judgement |x J is, to know [E/x]J (i.e. the substi-
tution of E for x in the expression J ) for any arbitrary expression
E, 2
As far as notation is concerned, the bar symbol binds the least tightly of all the
other notations we have considered. Likewise, general judgement may be iterated,
and the notation |x,y J will be used as notation for |x |y J .
2.3. Hypothetico-general judgement. When hypothetical judgement is used
inside general judgement, as in |xA(x) true (B(x) true), we term the whole thing
a “hypothetico-general” judgement. One thing bears clarifying, which is, Why do
we write P true (P true) rather than |P P true (P true)?
The former is really not a single judgement, but rather a scheme for judge-
ments, where P is intended to be replaced with a concrete expression by the person
2Technically, E is qualified as being of the same valence as x, but because we have not developed
a formal theory of expressions in this presentation, I choose to ignore this issue.
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asserting the judgements. On the other hand, the latter is itself a single judgement
which may be asserted all on its own.
3. Propositions and verifications
Now that we have propounded and explained the minimal system of judgements
for a logical theory, let us populate it with propositions. First, we have falsity ⊥,
and we wish to make ⊥ prop evident; to do this, we simply state what counts as a
direct verification of ⊥: there is no direct verification of ⊥.
The next basic proposition is trivial truth ⊤, and to make ⊤ prop evident, we
state that a direct verification of ⊤ is trivial. The definition of ⊤ thus validates the
judgement ⊤ true (i.e. that we have a verification of ⊤; this is immediate).
Next, let us define conjunction; in doing so, we will make evident the hypo-
thetical judgement
P ∧Q prop (P prop, Q prop)
Equivalently, we can display this as a rule of inference:3
P prop Q prop
P ∧Q prop
A direct verification of P ∧ Q consists in a verification of P and a verification
of Q; this validates the assertion of the judgement P ∧Q true (P true, Q true).
Because it is a valid inference, we can write it as an inference rule:
P true Q true
P ∧Q true
A direct verification of P ∨Q may be got either from a verification of P or one
of Q. From this definition we know P ∨Q prop (P prop, Q prop), or
P prop Q prop
P ∨Q prop
The verification conditions of disjunction give rise to two evident judgements P ∨Q true (P true)
and P ∨Q true (Q true), which we can write as inference rules:
P true
P ∨Q true
Q true
P ∨Q true
Finally, we must define the circumstances under which P ⊃ Q is a proposition
(i.e. when P ⊃ Q prop is evident). And we intend this to be under the circumstances
3 Evident hypothetical judgements are often written as rules, i.e.
premise
conclusion
rather than conclusion (premise). It must be stressed that only evident/known judgements may
be written in this way.
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that P is a proposition, and also that Q is a proposition assuming that P is true.
In other words, P ⊃ Q prop (P prop, Q prop (P true)), or
P prop Q prop (P true)
P ⊃ Q prop
Now, to validate this judgement will be a bit more complicated than the previ-
ous ones. But by unfolding the meaning explanations for hypothetical judgement,
proposition-hood and truth of a proposition, we arrive at the following explanation:
To know P ⊃ Q prop (P prop, Q prop (P true)) is to know what
counts as a direct verification of P ⊃ Q when one knows what
counts as a direct verification of P , and, when one has such a
verification, what counts as a direct verification of Q.4
If the judgement P ⊃ Q prop (P prop, Q prop (P true)) is going to be made
evident, then we must come up with what should count as a direct verification of
P ⊃ Q under the assumptions described above.
And so to have a direct verification of P ⊃ Q is to have a verification of Q
assuming that one has one of P ; this is the meaning of implication, and it validates
the judgement P ⊃ Q true (Q true (P true)), and may be written as an inference
rule as follows:
Q true (P true)
P ⊃ Q true
4. Judgements for verifications
So far, we have given judgements which define what it means to be a propo-
sition, namely P prop, and thence for each proposition, we have by definition a
notion of what should count as a verification of that proposition. And we have a
judgement P true, which in its assertion means that one has (a way to obtain) such
a verification of P , but we have not considered any judgements which actually refer
to the verifications themselves symbolically.
It is a hallmark of Martin-Lo¨f’s program to resolve the contradiction between
syntax and semantics not by choosing symbols over meanings or meanings over
symbols, but by endowing symbols with meaning in the course of knowing the
evident judgements. As such, P is a symbol, but when we assert P prop we
are saying that we know what proposition P denotes.
A similar thing can be done with verifications themselves, by representing them
with symbols in the same way we have done for the propositions. And then, we
can consider a judgement such as “M is a verification of P”, and in knowing that
4Note that unless P true, it need not be evident that Q prop; in other words, Q only has to be a
proposition if P is true. It would also be acceptable to give a stronger definition to implication,
but this is the one accepted by Martin-Lo¨f.
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judgement, we know what verification M is meant to denote. In practice, this
judgement has been written in several ways:
Notation Pronunciation
M ∈ P M is an element of P
M  P M realizes P
P xextMy P is witnessed by M
But they all mean the same thing, so we will choose the notation M ∈ P
and pronounce it “M verifies P”. Tentatively, the following defective meaning
explanation could be given:
* To know M ∈ P is to know that M is a verification of P .
But now that we have started to assign expressions to verifications, we must be
more careful about differentiating direct verifications (which we will call “canoni-
cal”) from indirect verifications (which we will call “non-canonical”). So the domain
of expressions must itself be accorded with a notion of reduction to canonical form,
and this corresponds with putting into action a plan of verification in order to get
a direct (canonical) verification; reduction to canonical form will be represented by
a judgement M ⇓M ′ , pronounced “M evaluates to M ′”.
To know M ⇓ M ′ is to know that M is an expression which
reduces to a canonical form M ′.
An example of an evident reduction judgement in elementary mathematics
would be 3 + 4 ⇓ 7; note that 3 + 4 ⇓ 1 + 6 is, on the other hand, not evident,
since this judgement describes reduction to canonical form, whereas 1 + 6 is not a
canonical number.
Now, we can correct the previous meaning explanation as follows:
To know M ∈ P is to know an M ′ such that M ⇓M ′ and M ′ is
a canonical (direct) verification of P .
If it is not yet clear why it would have been a mistake to fail to use the notion of
reduction to canonical form in the above meaning explanation, consider that each
time a proposition is defined, it should be possible to do so without knowing what
other propositions exist in the theory. But if we consider non-canonical forms (as
would be necessary if we omitted the M ⇓M ′ premise), then we would have to fix
in advance all the possible non-canonical forms in the computation system in the
course of defining each proposition. As such, the open-ended nature of the logic
would be destroyed; in a later chapter, the seriousness of this problem will be made
even more clear.
The meaning explanation for P prop must be accordingly modified to take into
account the computational behavior of expressions:
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To know P prop is to know a P ′ such that P ⇓ P ′ and P ′ is
a canonical proposition, which is to say, that one knows what
counts as a canonical verification for P ′.
In practice, when it is clear that P is canonical, then we will simply say, “To
know P prop is to know what counts as a canonical verification of P”. As an
example, then, we will update the evidence of the following assertion:
P ⊃ Q prop (P prop, Q prop (P true))
The meaning of this, expanded into spoken language, is as follows:
To know P ⊃ Q prop (P prop, Q prop (P true)) is to know what
counts as a canonical (direct) verification of P ⊃ Q under the
circumstances that P ⇓ P ′, such that one knows what counts as a
canonical verification P ′, and, if one has such a verification, Q ⇓
Q′ such that one knows what counts as a canonical verification
of Q′.
And the above judgement is evident, since we will say that a canonical verifi-
cation of P ⊃ Q is an expression λx.E such that we know the hypothetico-general
judgement |xE ∈ Q (x ∈ P ). This validates the assertion λx.E ∈ P ⊃ Q (|xE ∈
Q (x ∈ P )), or, written as an inference rule:
|x E ∈ Q (x ∈ P )
λx.E ∈ P ⊃ Q
By the addition of this judgement, we have graduated from a logical theory to a
type theory, in the sense of Constructive Mathematics and Computer Programming
(Martin-Lo¨f, 1979). In fact, we may dispense with the original P true form of
judgement by defining it in terms of the new M ∈ P judgement as follows:
M ∈ P
P true
CHAPTER 2
Computational Type Theories
As alluded to at the end of the previous chapter, we may add a judgement
M ∈ A which deals directly with the objects M which verify the propositions (or
types) P . We will develop a full theory of dependent types in the sense of Martin-
Lo¨f.1
1. The categorical judgements
Because we will need to consider the introduction of types which do not have a
trivial (intensional) equality relation, we must first amend the meaning explanations
for some of our judgements, and add a few new forms of judgement. First, we will
refer to types rather than propositions in order to emphasize the generality of the
theory; in some presentations, the word set is used instead.
The meaning of hypothetical and general judgement are the same as in the pre-
vious chapter, and so we will not reproduce them here. The first form of judgement
is A type , and its meaning explanation is as follows:
To know A type is to know an A′ such that A ⇓ A′, and you know
what counts as a canonical verification of A′ and when two such
verifications are equal.
The next form of judgement is M ∈ A , which remains the same as before:
To know M ∈ A (presupposing A type) is to know an M ′ such
that M ⇓M ′ and M ′ is a canonical verification of A.
We’ll need to add new judgements for equality (equality of verifications, and
equality of types respectively). First, equality of verifications is written M = N ∈ A ,
and means the following:
To know M = N ∈ A (presupposing M ∈ A and N ∈ A, and
thence A type) is to know that the values of M and N are equal
as canonical verifications of A.
1Please note that the judgements given here, and their meaning explanations, are not the same as
those used in Constable et al’s “Computational Type Theory” and Nuprl. In this chapter, we use
the term “computational type theory” in a general sense to characterize a family of type theories
which have their origin in Martin-Lo¨f’s 1979 paper Constructive Mathematics and Computer
Programming.
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The fact that M and N reduce to canonical values which verify A is known
from the presuppositions of the judgement; and what it means for them to be equal
as such is known from the evidence of the presupposition A type which is obtained
from the other presuppositions.
For equality of types A = B type , there are a number of possible meaning
explanations, but we’ll use the one that Martin-Lo¨f used starting in 1979:
To know A = B type (presupposing A type and B type) is to
know |M M ∈ B (M ∈ A) and |M M ∈ A (M ∈ B), and more-
over |M,N M = N ∈ B (M = N ∈ A) and |M,N M = N ∈
A (M = N ∈ B).
In other words, two types are equal when they have the same canonical verifi-
cations, and moreover, the same equality relation over their canonical verifications.
Note that there are other possible explanations for type equality, including more
intensional ones that appeal to the syntactic structure of type expressions, and
these turn out to be more useful in proof assistants for practical reasons. However,
the extensional equality that we have expounded is the easiest and most obvious
one to formulate, so we will use it here.
2. The functional sequent judgement
Now, because we are allowing the definition of types with arbitrary equivalence
relations, we cannot use plain hypothetico-general judgement in the course of defin-
ing our types. For instance, if we were going to try and define the function type
A ⊃ B in the same way as we did in the previous chapter, we would permit “func-
tions” which are not in fact functional, i.e. they do not take equal inputs to equal
outputs. As such, we will need to bake functionality (also called extensionality)
into the definition of functions, and since we will need this in many other places,
we elect to simplify our definitions by baking it into a single judgement which is
meant to be used instead of plain hypothetico-general judgement.
The judgement which expresses simultaneously generality, hypothesis and func-
tionality has been written in multiple ways. Martin-Lo¨f has always written it as
J (Γ), but this is a confusing notation because it appears as though it is merely a
hypothetical judgement (but it is much more, as will be seen). Very frequently, it is
written with a turnstile, Γ ⊢ J , and in the early literature surrounding Constable’s
Computational Type Theory and Nuprl, it was written Γ≫ J ; we choose this last
option to avoid confusion with a similar judgement form which appears in proof-
theoretic, intensional type theories; we’ll call the judgement form a “(functional)
sequent”.
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We will define several forms of judgment simultaneously with the sequent judg-
ments: Γ ctx (“Γ is a context”), x # Γ (“x is fresh in Γ”).
To know Γ ctx is to know that Γ ≡ ·, or it is to know a variable
x and expressions ∆, A such that Γ ≡ ∆, x : A and ∆≫ A type,
and x # ∆.
To know x # Γ (presupposing Γ ctx) is to know that Γ ≡ ·, or,
if Γ ≡ ∆, y : A such that x is not y and x # ∆.
In other words, the well-formed contexts are inductively generated by the fol-
lowing grammar:
· ctx
Γ ctx Γ≫ A type x # Γ
Γ, x : A ctx
x # ·
x # Γ
x # Γ, y : A
Next, we define the notion of an environment or substitution for a context,
ρ ∈⋆ Γ . It is possible to define this more generally as functional maps from one
context to another, but for our purposes, this is the only case we need.
To know ρ ∈⋆ Γ, presupposing Γ ctx , is to know, if Γ ≡ ·, then
ρ ≡ ·; otherwise, if Γ ≡ ∆, x : A then ρ ≡ ρ′,M such that ρ′ ∈⋆ ∆
and [ρ′/∆]M ∈ [ρ′/∆]A. The substitution [ρ/Γ] is effected by
replacing each variable in Γ with the corresponding term in ρ.
We will also specify when two environments are equal, ρ0 = ρ1 ∈
⋆ Γ :
To know ρ0 = ρ1 ∈
⋆ Γ, presupposing Γ ctx , ρ0 ∈
⋆ Γ and ρ1 ∈
⋆ Γ
is to know, if Γ ≡ ·, then ρ0 ≡ · and ρ1 ≡ ·; otherwise, if
Γ ≡ ∆, x : A and thence ρ0 ≡ ρ
′
0,M0 and ρ1 ≡ ρ
′
1,M1, then
ρ′0 = ρ
′
1 ∈
⋆ ∆ and [ρ0/∆]M0 = [ρ1/∆]M1 ∈ [ρ0/∆]A.
We will say that Γ ≫ J is only a judgement under the presuppositions that
Γ ctx and that J is a categorical judgement of the form A type, A = B type,
M ∈ A, or M = N ∈ A. Now we may begin giving the meaning explanations for
Γ≫ J , starting with typehood with respect to a context:
To know Γ≫ A type (presupposing Γ ctx) to know |ρ [ρ/Γ]A type (ρ ∈
⋆
Γ) and moreover, to know |ρ0,ρ1 [ρ0/Γ]A = [ρ1/Γ]A type (ρ0 =
ρ1 ∈
⋆ Γ).
We can explain type equality sequents in a similar way:
To know Γ ≫ A = B type (presupposing Γ ctx , Γ ≫ A type,
Γ≫ B type) is to know
|ρ [ρ/Γ]A = [ρ/Γ]B type (ρ ∈
⋆ Γ)
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and moreover, to know
|ρ0,ρ1 [ρ0/Γ]A = [ρ1/Γ]B type (ρ0 = ρ1 ∈
⋆ Γ)
Next, the meaning of membership sequents is explained:
To know Γ ≫ M ∈ A (presupposing Γ ctx , Γ ≫ A type) is to
know |ρ [ρ/Γ]M ∈ [ρ/Γ]A (ρ ∈
⋆ Γ) and moreover, to know
|ρ0,ρ1 [ρ0/Γ]M = [ρ1/Γ]M ∈ [ρ0/Γ]A (ρ0 = ρ1 ∈
⋆ Γ)
Finally, member equality sequents have an analogous explanation:
To know Γ ≫ M = M ′ ∈ A (presupposing Γ ctx , Γ ≫ A type)
is to know |ρ [ρ/Γ]M = [ρ/Γ]N ∈ [ρ/Γ]A (ρ ∈
⋆ Γ) and moreover,
to know
|ρ0,ρ1 [ρ0/Γ]M = [ρ1/Γ]N ∈ [ρ0/Γ]A (ρ0 = ρ1 ∈
⋆ Γ)
The simultaneous definition of multiple judgements may seem at first concern-
ing, but it can be shown to be non-circular by induction on the length of the context
Γ.
3. The definitions of types
We will now define the types of a simple computational type theory without
universes. In the course of doing so, opportunities will arise for further clarifying
the position of the judgements, meaning explanations and proofs on the one hand,
and the propositions, definitions and verifications on the other hand.
3.1. The unit type. First, we introduce two canonical forms with trivial
reduction rules:
(Canonical) unit ⇓ unit • ⇓ •
Next, we intend to make the judgement unit type evident; and this is done
by defining what counts as a canonical verification of unit and when two such
verifications are equal. To this end, we say that • is a canonical verification of unit,
and that it is equal to itself. I wish to emphasize that this is the entire definition
of the type: we have introduced syntax, and we have defined the canonical forms,
and there is nothing more to be done.
In the presentations of type theory which are currently in vogue, a type is “de-
fined” by writing out a bunch of inference rules, but in type theory, the definitions
that we have given above are prior to the rules, which are justified in respect of the
definitions and the meaning explanations of the judgements. For instance, based on
the meaning of the various forms of sequent judgement, the following rule schemes
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are justified:
Γ≫ unit type Γ≫ unit = unit type
Γ≫ • ∈ unit Γ≫ • = • ∈ unit
Each of the assertions above has evidence of a certain kind; since the justifica-
tion of these rules with respect to the definitions of the logical constants and the
meaning explanations of the judgements is largely self-evident, we omit it in nearly
all cases. It is just important to remember that it is not the rules which define the
types; a type A is defined in the course of causing the judgement A type to become
evident. These rules merely codify standard patterns of use, nothing more, and
they must each be justified.
3.2. The empty type. The empty type is similarly easy to define. First, we
introduce a constant:
void ⇓ void(Canonical)
To make the judgement void type evident, we will say that there are no canonical
verifications of void, and be done with it. This definition validates some further rules
schemes:
Γ≫ void type Γ≫ void = void type
Γ≫M ∈ void
Γ≫ J
The last rule simply says that if we have a verification of void, then we may
conclude any judgement whatsoever. Remember that the inference rules are just
notation for an evident hypothetical judgement, e.g. Γ≫ J (Γ≫M ∈ void).
Note that we did not introduce any special constant into the computation sys-
tem to represent the elimination of a verification of void (in proof-theoretic type
theories, this non-canonical form is usually called abort(R)). This is because, com-
putationally speaking, there is never any chance that we should ever have use for
such a term, since we need only consider the evaluation of closed terms (which
is guaranteed by the meaning explanations), and by its very definition, there can
never be a closed verification of void.
3.3. The cartesian product of a family of types. This will be our first
dependent type, and it will likewise be the first example of a non-trivial addition to
the computation system. First, let us add our canonical and non-canonical forms
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and their reduction rules:
Π(A;x.B) ⇓ Π(A;x.B) λ(x.E) ⇓ λ(x.E)(Canonical)
M ⇓ λ(x.E) [N/x]E ⇓M ′
ap(M ;N) ⇓M ′(Non-canonical)
This is the first time in this chapter that we have introduced a term former with
binding structure; it should be noted that the intensional equality of expressions is
up to alpha equivalence, and we will not pay attention to issues of variable renaming
in our presentation.
We will make evident the following judgement scheme:
A type x : A≫ B type
Π(A;x.B) type
Or, written as a hypothetical judgement:
Π(A;x.B) type (A type, x : A≫ B type)
This is to say, under the stated assumptions, we know what counts as a
canonical verification of Π(A;x.B) and when two such verifications are equal. We
will say that λ(x.E) is a canonical verification of Π(A;x.B) just when we know
x : A≫ E ∈ B; moreover, that two verifications λ(x.E) and λ(y.E′) are equal just
when z ∈ A≫ [z/x]E = [z/y]E′ ∈ [z/x]B.
By the meaning of the sequent judgement, this is to say that a lambda ex-
pression must be functional with respect to its domain (i.e. it must take equals
to equals). We did not need to hypothesize directly two elements of the domain
and their equality because this is part of the meaning explanation for the sequent
judgement already. Likewise, two lambda expressions are equal when equal inputs
yield equal results in both.
The familiar inference rules, which codify the standard mode of use for the
family cartesian product, are justified by this definition:
Γ≫ A type Γ, x : A≫ B type
Γ≫ Π(A;x.B) type
Γ≫ A = A′ type Γ, z : A≫ [z/x]B = [z/y]B′ type
Γ≫ Π(A;x.B) = Π(A′; y.B′) type
Γ, x : A≫ E ∈ B
Γ≫ λ(x.E) ∈ Π(A;x.B)
Γ, z : A≫ [z/x]E = [z/y]E′ ∈ [z/x]B
Γ≫ λ(x.E) = λ(y.E′) ∈ Π(A;x.B)
Γ≫M ∈ Π(A;x.B) Γ≫ N ∈ A
Γ≫ ap(M ;N) ∈ [N/x]B
Γ≫M =M ′ ∈ Π(A;x.B) Γ≫ N = N ′ ∈ A′
Γ≫ ap(M ;N) = ap(M ′;N ′) ∈ [N/x]B
Note that the type equality rule scheme that we gave above is structural; it is
validated by the meaning explanations, but it is by no means the full totality of
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possible equalities between family cartesian product types, which is extensional in
this theory.
It will be instructive to explicitly justify the application rule above with respect
to the meaning explanations, since I have claimed that such rules are posterior to
the definitions we expounded prior to giving these rules.
Proof. It suffices to consider the case that Γ ⇓ ·, because hypotheses may
always be added to the context (this is called weakening). And so, by the meaning
of the sequent judgement at the empty context, the rule amounts to the assertion
ap(M ;N) ∈ [N/x]B (M ∈ Π(A;x.B), N ∈ A)
By the meaning explanation for hypothetical judgement, and the definition of
the family cartesian product type, we know that M ⇓ λ(x.E) for some E such that
we know x : A≫ E ∈ B; from the meaning of the sequent judgement and the notion
of an environment for a context, we can conclude |L [L/x]E ∈ [L/x]B (L ∈ A). On
the other hand, from the computation rules, we know that if for some particular
E′, [N/x]E ⇓ E′, then we know ap(λ(x.E);N) ⇓ E′; to demonstrate the evidence
of the premise, we may instantiate L at N to know [N/x]E ∈ [N/x]B, whence by
the meaning of membership, we know that there exists some canonical E′ such that
[N/x] ⇓ E′.


CHAPTER 3
Proof Theories and Logical Frameworks
1. Proof-theoretic type theory
1.1. Analytic and synthetic judgement. A synthetic judgement is one for
which the experience of coming to know it necessarily entails some knowledge which
is not implicit in the statement of the judgement; on the other hand, to know an
analytic judgement is to know it purely on the basis of the information contained
inside it. So analytic judgements are decidable, since if they may become evident,
it will be purely on the basis of their own content; whereas synthetic judgements
become evident to someone when they have obtained some particular evidence for
them.
A logical theory has, then, both analytic and synthetic judgements; the judge-
ment P prop is analytic, since its evidence follows from the definition of P , whereas
the assertion of P true entails the knowledge of some extra information, namely a
verification of P . When we have extended the logical theory to a type theory in
the manner of the previous chapter, the judgement M ∈ P is also synthetic, since
M ∈ P is not self-evident in general.
But why is it not enough to assert that M verifies P to know whether M ∈ P?
It suffices to define a P such that one cannot decide in general whether some term
is a verification of it. Let us define the propositional symbol P, and we intend to
know the judgement P prop, whose meaning is to be expanded as follows:
To know P prop is to know counts as a canonical verification of
P.
We will say, then, that • is a canonical verification of P just when Goldbach’s
conjecture is true. Then it comes immediately that the judgement M ∈ P may not
be known or refuted on its own basis, nor even the judgement • ∈ P, since they
depend on a proposition whose truth is not known:
To know M ∈ P is to know that M ⇓M ′ to a canonical verification of P .
 To know M ∈ P is to know that M ⇓ • such that Goldbach’s conjecture
is true.
1.2. Proof of a judgement vs. verification of a proposition. Because
the judgement M ∈ P is synthetic, we cannot say that it gives rise to a proof
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theory for the logic, since the core judgement of a proof theory M : A must be
analytic, in order to avoid the infinite regress of a proof theory requiring a proof
theory requiring a proof theory, and so on.
The notion of verification of a proposition could never be the same as proof
anyway, except in the most trivial circumstances, since a verification is meant to be
an effective operation which realizes the truth of a proposition, and no constraints
whatsoever (termination, totality, etc.) are placed on these operations except those
which come from the meaning of the judgements (see [4], [16], [17]).
So a proof theory is necessarily intensional, and its judgements are to be ana-
lytic/decidable. What is it, then, that we have considered so far which corresponds
with a proof M such that M : P in a proof theory? As discussed above, M is not
merely a term such that M ∈ P , since this is not in general enough information
to know whether M is a proof. In fact, M must comprise all the logical inferences
which led to the knowledge that P is true, and so a meaning explanation for the
judgement M : P in a proof theory immediately suggests itself:
To know M : P is to know that M is evidence (demonstration,
proof, derivation) of the judgement P true.
And so the term domain of the proof theory is not the same as the one that
we have considered so far; it must consist in terms which represent traces of the
inferences made in the course of knowing the judgements of a logical theory. There
is a sense in which one can consider the types of a proof theory to interpret the
judgements of the logical theory, and this methodology is called “judgements as
types” (and this implies “derivations as terms”).
What I am calling a “proof-theoretic type theory” is a type theory of the
sort used in the proof assistants Agda, Coq and Idris, whereas the kind of type
theory that I have described in the previous sections, the one based on meaning
explanations, underlies the proof assistant Nuprl.
The proof-theoretic type theories on the one hand are often called “intensional”
and the computational type theories on the other hand are usually “extensional”;
these characterizations are certainly true, though they are not essential ; moreover,
I fear that comparing one of the former with one of the latter is not quite fair, since
there is not any clear analogy to be had. That is to say, the judgement M ∈ P
is a judgement which is added to a logical theory and its meaning is (briefly) “M
evaluates to a canonical verification of P”, whereas M : P cannot be construed as
a judgement added to a logical theory. Instead, it must be understood as part of
a (proof) theory which is overlayed atop an existing logical theory; it is possible to
understand the theory which contains the judgement M : P to be a metatheory, or
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logical framework, for the theory which contains the judgement P true, which can
be construed as the “object language”.
In short, the judgements M ∈ P and M : P are unrelated to each other in
two respects: firstly, that they have different meanings, and secondly that the one
is at the same level as the judgements of a logical theory, whereas the latter is a
judgement in a theory which is defined over a logical theory.
2. Martin-Lo¨f ’s equational logical framework
To make this more concrete, let us expound a proof theoretic type theory called
MLLF, which stands for “Martin-Lo¨f’s (equational) logical framework”;1 in the
course of introducing each type, we will specify which judgement of the underlying
logical theory it is meant to interpret.
We start with four categorical judgements:
Judgement Form Pronunciation
α : type α is a type
α = β : type α and β are equal types
M : α M is of type α
M = N : α M and N are equal at type α
But we have not defined the meaning of the judgements; let us do so below:
To know α : type is to know what counts as an object of type α,
and when two such objects are equal.
For now, we’ll leave the question of what is an “object” as abstract; in many
cases, types will represent judgements of a logical theory, and the objects will be
the derivations (demonstrations, proofs) of those judgements.
To know α = β : type is to know that any object of type α is
also an object of type β, and two equal objects of type α are
equal as objects of type β (necessarily presupposing α : type and
β : type).
To know M : α is to know that M is an object of type α (neces-
sarily presupposing α : type).
To knowM = N : α is to know that M and N are equal objects
of type α (necessarily presupposing M : α and N : α).
In addition to the above judgements, we will need contexts (with their well-
formedness judgement Γ ctx ) and an intensional sequent judgement Γ ⊢ J ; their
1For a detailed overview of Martin-Lo¨f’s equational logical framework, see [15].
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meanings here will differ from the sequent judgements of computational type the-
ory, in that they must mean proof-theoretic derivability, rather than semantic con-
sequence.
At this point, we may begin adding types to the logical framework. In practice,
most types which we will introduce in the logical framework will be defined in terms
of a judgement of the logical theory which lies below it. For instance, hypothetical
judgement in the logical theory is represented by a function type in the logical
framework, (x : α)β, whose typehood is meant to be evident under the following
circumstances
α : type x : α ⊢ β : type
(x : α)β : type
Or as a hypothetical judgement, (x : α)β : type (α : type, x : α ⊢ β : type).
Now, to know this judgement is to know that under the circumstances we know
what is an object of type α and when two such objects are equal, and that if we
have such an object x of type α, we know what an object of type β is, and when
two such objects are equal—then we know what an object of type (x : α)β is, and
moreover, for any two objects y, z of type α, that [y/x]β and [z/x]β are equal as
types. To make this evident, then, we will say that under those circumstances an
object of type (x : α)β is an object [x]M such that one knows x : α ⊢ M : β and
|x,y [y/x]M = [z/x]M : [y/x]β (y = z : α); furthermore, two such objects are equal
just when they yield equal outputs for equal inputs.
Then, for each atomic proposition P , we can easily define a type Prf(P ), as
follows. Under the circumstances that P prop in the logical theory, then Prf(P ) :
type in the logical framework, since we will define an object of type Prf(P ) to be a
derivation of P true; beyond reflexivity, further definitional equalities can be added
to reflect the harmony of introduction and elimination rules.
Now, the definitions we have given for the types above are “intuitively” correct,
but they actually fail to satisfy the meaning explanation that we have given for
α : type, because they do not take into account neutral terms. In the following
sections, we will investigate this problem in more detail and propose a solution.
2.1. What is an “object”? It is time to revisit what it means to be an
“object” of a type in the proof-theoretic type theory; we must note how this will
necessarily differ from what it meant to be a “verification” of a proposition in
the previous sections. Namely, a verification of a proposition is either a canonical
verification of that proposition (and what sort of thing this might be is known from
the presupposition P prop), or it is a means of getting such a canonical verification
(i.e. a term which evaluates to a canonical verification).
On the other hand, what we have called an “object” of type P is quite different,
since in addition to the possibility that it is a canonical proof of the judgement
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P true, it may also be neutral (i.e. blocked by a variable); we will call this “normal”
rather than “canonical”. Why does this happen?
In order to keep the judgement M : A analytic (decidable), its meaning expla-
nation can no longer be based on the idea of the computation of closed terms to
canonical form; instead, we will consider the computation of open terms (i.e. terms
with free variables) to normal form. The desire for M : A to be analytic follows
from our intention that it characterize a proof theory: we must be able to recognize
a proof when we see one. But why are closed-term-based meaning explanations
incompatible with this goal? Consider briefly the following judgement:
|nM(n) ∈ P (n ∈ N)
To know this judgement is to know that M(n) computes to a canonical ver-
ification of P whenever n is a natural number; when P ’s use of n is not trivial,
this amounts to testing an infinite domain (all of the natural numbers), probably
by means of mathematical induction. The judgement is then clearly synthetic:
to know it is, briefly, to have come up with an (inductive) argument that M(N)
computes to a canonical verification of P at each natural number n.
On the other hand, the judgement n : N ⊢ M(n) : P must have a different
meaning, one which admits its evidence or refutation purely on syntactic/analytic
grounds. In essence, it is to know that M(n) is a proof of P for any arbitrary
object/expression n such that n : N (i.e., the only thing we know about n is that it
is of type N; we do not necessarily know that it is a numeral).
3. A critique of MLLF
The type theory which we constructed in the previous section is to be considered
a proof theory for a logic with the judgements P prop, P true and J (J ′). There
are a few reasons to be dissatisfied with this state of affairs, which I shall enumerate
in this section.
3.1. Lack of computational content. Unlike the type theory in the first
chapter, there is no built-in computational content. In a computational type theory
which is defined by the verificationist meaning explanations, the computational
content of terms is understood immediately by means of the M ⇓M ′ relation; that
is, computation is prior to the main judgements because their meaning explanations
are defined in terms of evaluation to canonical form.
On the other hand, in the type theory above we did not give a primitive re-
duction relation; instead, we simply permitted the endowement of proofs with defi-
nitional equalities which reflect the harmony of introduction and elimination rules.
That is, if we have known the judgement P true by means of an indirect argu-
ment (derivation), it must be the case that this derivation corresponds to a direct
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one; we reflect this in the proof theory by defining the indirect derivation to be
definitionally equal to the direct one.
However, this does not amount to computational content being present in terms:
only post facto may the definitional equality be construed as giving rise to compu-
tation, through a metamathematical argument which shows that the definitional
equality is confluent and can be used to define a functional normalization relation.
And this is the reason for the peculiarity of the proof-theoretic meaning expla-
nations, namely that they do not include phrases like “evaluates to a canonical...”,
since evaluation may only be understood after taking the meanings of the judge-
ments (α : type, α = β : type, M : α, M = N : α) as giving rise to a closed formal
system which is susceptible to metamathematical argument: to refer to evaluation
in the meaning explanations for the core judgements, then, would be impredicative.
3.2. Modularity of definition. By the same token, the distinction between
canonical (direct) and non-canonical (indirect) proof may not be understood as a
core notion in the theory, but must be understood separately, secondarily. Why is
this a problem? It means that the definition of each type must be made with the
full knowledge of the definitions of every other type; in essence, the open-ended
nature of type theory is obliterated and one is forced into a fixed formal system;
this is in addition to the fact that it causes the epistemic content of α : type for
any type α to be extremely complicated.
To illustrate, let us consider as an example a type theory which has four type-
formers: trivial truth ⊤, trivial falsity ⊥, implication (α)β, and conjunction α&β;
we will then introduce the following terms to represent proofs: the trivial element •,
reductio ad absurdum abort(α;E), abstraction [x : α]E, application E(E′), pairing
〈E,E′〉, and projections fst(E), snd(E).
If we will try to make the judgement ⊤ : type evident, the deficiencies of the
formulation will immediately present themselves.
To know ⊤ : type is to know what counts as an object of type
⊤, and when two such objects are equal. An object of type ⊤,
then, is either the expression •, or an expression abort(⊤;E) such
that we know E : ⊥, or an expression E(E′) such that we know
E : (α)⊤ and E′ : α, or an expression fst(E) such that we know
E : ⊤&β for some β, or an expression snd(E) such that we know
E : α&⊤ for some α; and we additionally have that • is equal to
•, and ...
To save space, we elide the rest of the definition of equality for ⊤; what we have
seen so far already suffices to bring to light a serious problem: the definition of any
type requires knowledge of the entire syntax of the theory. The judgement α : type
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may never be made evident in isolation, but must be done with full understanding
of all the other types and their definitions.
Furthermore, to extend an existing theory with a new type, the definitions of
every other type must be rewritten to account for the elimination forms of the new
type.
4. A way forward: verifications & uses
The second critique of MLLF may be partially addressed by fragmenting type
theory into a logic of verifications & uses : instead of a type being defined by its
introduction rules, it must be simultaneously defined by its introduction rules (ver-
ifications) and its elimination rules (uses). In practice, this amounts to a standard
technique known as bidirectional type checking.
The semantic priority of the forms of judgement also changes drastically: the
sequent judgement must in this case be explained before the categorical judgements;
moreover, sequents may no longer be explained modularly in terms of general and
hypothetical judgement, since the latter amounts to semantic consequence (admis-
sibility), whereas the meaning of a sequent in a proof theory should be syntactic
consequence (derivability).
Because the target theory lacks computation, it is necessary to rule out redexes
from terms syntactically, but this complicates the definition of substitution; to
address this, Watkins introduced in [18] a technique known as hereditary substitu-
tion, which is a family of syntax-directed (algorithmic) judgements which contract
redexes along the way, guaranteeing canonical form in their outputs. Both bidirec-
tional type checking and hereditary substitutions have been used to great effect in
the descendants of the Edinburgh Logical Framework (see [10]).
The first critique, the lack of computational content, is more difficult to address.
Roughly, the right way to do it is to replace the notion of the evaluation of closed
terms to canonical form with the evaluation of open terms to normal form. Peter
Dybjer demonstrates in [5] how this technique may be used to endow the Calculus
of Constructions with a meaning explanation, albeit necessarily of a very different
kind than we have considered here.
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